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LEGISLATION
A STUDY OF GERRYMANDERING IN KENTUCKY

By ROBERT B. STEwART*
If there is a single principle upon which American political
thought is of one accord, it is the belief that population should
serve as the basis of representation. The War of Independence,
in fact, was fought largely for the right of the people to choose
their law makers. The "three-fifths" clause of the United States
Constitution has long since been superseded by the Fourteenth
Amendment providing for apportionment of representatives according to the "whole number of persons."
This latter principle is also embodied in state constitutional
provisions. Its application, however, appears to have been only
rarely realized. The "counting of heads" has always been inaccurately performed, too often by a set of political jugglers.
REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS OP KENTUCKY

For the selection of members to the Kentucky House of
Representatives the State Constitution provides for a decennial
division of the State into "one hundred Representative districts, as nearly equal in population as may be without dividing
any county except where a county may include more than one
district."' According to the 1930 census Kentucky has a population of 2,614,589. Thus with an equal division, each of the
hundred districts should contain approximately 26,000 inhabitants. As now constituted, however, not even approximate
equality exists.
Forty-six districts have populations which vary more than
10,000 from the 26,000 normal. Twenty-one districts vary more
than 15,000 from the 26,000 average. The thirty-second and
forty-fifth districts, consisting of Mleade and Anderson counties
*Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky. A. B.
and M. A., University of Kentucky. "Impeachments in Kentucky,"
University of Kentucky Extension Series, October, 1930: "Shipping
Costs in Kentucky," The Kentucky City, April, 1932; "Beginning of
County Budgeting in Kentucky," National Municipal Review, May,
1933.
1 The Constitution of Kentucky, Section 33.
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respectively, each have scarcely more than 8,000 people. The
eight districts (51 to 58 inclusive) composing Jefferson County
(principally the city of Louisville), on the other hand, have an
average population of 44,419; the eighty-ninth district, composed of Boyd County and city of Ashland, has a population
of 43,849; the fourth district, composed of McCracken County
and the city of Paducah, 46,271; the ninety-eight district, Harlan and Leslie Counties, 75,322; and the ninety-seventh district,
Letcher and Perry Counties, 77,888.
Theoretically, and under constitutional guarantee, citizens
of every county of the State have equal representation in the
General Assembly. Practically, however, as seen from the
above, each voter of Meade and Anderson Counties has almost
ten times the authority in selecting the membership of the House
of Representatives as had the voter in Perry and Letcher
County. The net result would not be materially different, so
far as State legislation is concerned, if two voters of every three
in Perry County were completely disenfranchised and every
voter of Anderson County were given the privilege of casting
three votes instead of one.
A classification of the votes of these counties, as cast in
the gubernatorial electionz from 1911 to 1931, reveals a condition by no means coincidental. In each of the six elections
Anderson and Meade counties returned Democratic majorities.
Harlan, Letcher, Leslie, and Perry counties in every instance
gave overwhelming Republican majorities. For the twenty year
period the Republican vote in Harlan County averaged more
than four times the Democratic vote, and in Leslie County the
average was better than eight to one. This correlation between
small districts and Democratic majorities and between large
districts and Republican majorities is self-explanatory. Yet
voters of Kentucky are perhaps unaware of the fact that herein
either party, once it is in control of the legislature, possesses
an instrument whereby it may keep itself perpetually in power,
popular majorities of the opposing party to the contrary notwithstanding.
If further proof is needed to demonstrate that this is not
merely a play of the imagination but a real possibility, let us
compare the total population of the districts represented by
Democrats and those represented by Republicans in the 1932
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House of Representatives. The seventy-four districts represented by Democrats had a population of 1,755,405, or an average of only 23,721 per district. The twenty-six Republican
districts, in marked contrast, had a population totaling 859,184,
an average of 33,045 per district. This condition is not a recent
development. Rather it is one of long standing. In 1922, for
example, only four years after the present districts were set
up, each Democratic member of the Lower House represented,
on the average only 20,787 persons while each Republican
member represented 26,400.
SENATORIAL DISTRICTS OF KENTUCKY

Nor is this discrimination in any sense peculiar to the
House of Representatives. It is, in fact, even more pronounced
in the Senate. With an equal division of Kentucky's population each of the thirty-eight senatorial districts of the State
would contain 68,805 people. The present districts, however,
vary far above and below this average. The thirtieth district,
for instance, has a population of only 36,390, the fourth district 37,592, and the twenty-second district 37,812. The thirtyREPUBLICAN SENATORIAL DISTRICTS OF KENTUCKY*
District

Counties

7
15
16

Butler, Muhlenberg, Ohio ............................... i
74,873
McCreary, Pulaski, Whitley .........................
79,997
Clinton, Cumberland, Monroe, Russell,
I
Wayne .........-...
----......
.
-..............
I..... 60,063
Bell, Knox, Laurel
....................
86,122
Estill, Jackson, Madison, Owsley,
I
Rockcastle ....................................................
77,539
Carter, Elliott, Greenup, Lewis .........
70,279
Clay, Harlan, Leslie, Letcher, Perry ............
171,736
Boyd, Johnson, Lawrence, Martin ................
92,114

17
29
32
33
35
23
36
37
38

Population

I
Jefferson County (including
the city of Louisville) ............................ i

I

12

IAverage population per district ....................

355,350
1,068,073
89,006

*Based upon United States Census for 1930, the membership of
the 1932 General Assembly of Kentucky, and the Redistricting Act of
February 28, 1918 (Kentucky Acts, 1918, c. 3, p. 6).
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third district, on the other extreme, has a population of 171,736,
the thirteenth district, 120,439, the twenty-fourth district
93,534, and the thirty-fiftb. district 92,114.
DrmocRcTic SENATORIAL DiSTRICTS
District

I

OF KExTUCKy*

Counties

I Population

1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
26

Fulton, Graves, Hickman ................................
Ballard, Carlisle McCracken, Marshall ........
Caldwell, Calloway, Lyon, Trigg ...............
Crittenden, Livingston, Union ...................
Henderson, W ebster .........................................
Christian, Hopkins ............................................
Daviess, McLean ...............................................
Logan, Simpson, Todd ..............
Breckinridge, Grayson, Hancock, Hart ........
Allen, Edmonson, Warren-.............
Bullitt, Hardin, Larue, Meade
......
Floyd, Knott, Pike .............................................
Green, Marion, Nelson, Taylor, Washington
Boyle, Casey, Garrard, Lincoln ........
Adair, Barren, Metcalfe ...................................
Anderson, Franklin, Mercer, Spencer ........
Carroll, Henry, Oldham, Shelby, Trimble ....
Jessamine, Scott, Woodford ...........
Kenton .........................-................ .
Campbell ......................
Boone, Gallatin, Grant, Owen, Pendleton ....

27

Fayette

28
30
31
34
26

.................................................................

Bourbon, Clark, Montgomery ..........................
Bracken, Harrison, Nicholas, Robertson ....
Bath, Fleming, lMason, Menifee, Powell,
Rowan ............................................................
IBreathitt, Lee, Magoffin, Morgan, Wolfe ....1
Average population per district ......................

54,430
76,433
52,464
37,592
46,829
71,732
54,851
46,731
56,739
60,331
46,916
120,439
68,121
62,278
51,618
50,635
51,148
37,812
93,534
73,931
45,494
68,543

47,360
36,390
64,519
70,146
1,547,016
69 0'1

*Based upon United States Census for 1930, the membership of
the 1932 General Assembly of Kentucky and the Redistricting Act of
February 28, 1918 (Kentuc y Acts, 1918, c. 3, p. 6).

Again we find the benefits of these discriminations aceruing to the Democratic party -with a corresponding disadvantage
to Republicans. Democratic members of the 1922 Senate came
from districts containing, on the average, 60,177 people. The
Republican senator, during the same session, represented 79,385
people. Ten years later, in the 1932 session, each of the twentysix Democratic senators represented only 59,501 people. Each
of the twelve Republican senators in the 1932 session repre-
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sented an average population of 89,006. The Democratic party
lhas succeeded, therefore, in disenfranchising exactly one-third
of the members of the opposing party.
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CITIEs

It will be noted also that urban population in particular
is subject to discrimination in district representation. Louisville and Jefferson County should, according to population statistics, have fourteen representatives where they now have only
eight. Covington and Kenton County, with three representative districts at present, should have four. Newport and
Campbell County now b~aving only two representatives should
have three, and exactly the same condition prevails with regard
to Lexington and Fayette County. Paducah and McCracken
County, as well as Ashland and Boyd County, by population
entitled to two representatives, have only one each. Thus the
first and second class city districts, now having only seventeen
representatives, would have at least twenty-eight under an
equitable system of legislative districting.
Reasonalile discrimination might be supported by the State
Constitutional provision that in case inequality of population be
unavoidable, "the advantage resulting therefrom shall be given
to districts having the largest territory. " '2 But we cannot very
logically set this provision up as a defense in this particular
instance when it is grossly violated in other cases. Warren
County, for example, with a population of 33,676 and an area
of 530 square miles, is divided into two districts. Letcher and
Perry counties, with a population of 77,888 and an area of
690 square miles, compose only one district; Pike County, with
a population of 63,267 and an area of 779 square miles, has
only one Representative; and Leslie and Harlan counties with
a population of 75,322 and an area of 851 square miles have
only one Representative. While Warren is larger in area than
the average county of the state, it is from one hundred to three
hundred square miles smaller and its population less than onehalf that of the other districts named above. Yet it receives
twice the voice in the Lower House of the General Assembly.
Assuming that existing inequalities are "unavoidable," they
The Constitution of Kentucky, Section 33.
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by no means give advantage to those districts having the largest
territory. That being true, the discrimination becomes even
more indefensible.
Witbout doubt the infrequency of redistricting, together
with the decided movement toward cities and the industrial
development of southeastern Kentucky, accounts for a part of
this discrimination. There have been only two redistricting
acts under the present constitution adopted in 1890. The first
occurred in 1893, the second in 1918. We are here disregarding
the act of 1906 since it was declared unconstitutional the following year.
Relative to the act of 1906 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky said:
"That the act under discussion is grossly violative of section 33
of the Constitution, in that the injunction as to equality between the
districts was not even pretended to be obeyed by the Legislature is
not and cannot be denied.Twelve Democratic counties the population of the largest of which is 12,137 and the smallest, 7,407, are each
given a representative.-On the other hand there are twelve Republican districts composed in large part of two and three counties each,
the smallest of which districts has a population of 30,615 and the largest, 53,263, which are only given one representative each.-In other
words, a voter in Spencer county exercises in the Legislature of the
state more than seven times the influence of a voter in Ohio, Butler,
and Edmonson counties. This inequality is so glaring that it precludes
the possibility that there was any attempt on the part of the Legislature to apportion the state into 100 representative districts, as nearly
equal in population or area as might be.'

This "glaring" inequality of giving to every voter in
Spancer county seven times tble voting power of the voter in
Ohio, Edmonson, and Butler counties is completely dwarfed by
the present practice of giving to each voter of Meade and
Anderson counties ten times the voice in the General Assembly
as the voter in Perry or Letcher county.
We are not insisting that equality of representation can
be made mathematically exact. The framers of the Kentucky
Constitution recognized this impossibility and made provision
for districts "as nearly equal in population as may be
"
Daniel Webster as chairman of a United States senatorial reapportionment committee once said: "That which cannot be
done perfectly must be done in a manner as near perfection
as can be. If exactness cannot, from the nature of things, be
3Ragland v. Anderson, 30 K. L. R. 1199; 100 S. W. 867 (1907).
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attained, then. the nearest practicable approach to exactness
ought to be made. Congress is not absolved from all rule,
merely because the rule of perfect justice cannot be applied.
In such a case approximation becomes a rule."
The above definition of equality of representation we
accept, as did the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1907, as the
proper view. It is this equality which we have herein demonstrated to be more grossly violated than in the invalid redistricting of 1906. Yet the courts are apparently helpless.
According to the 1907 decision the authority of the courts is
limited to declaring a redistricting act invalid before it goes
into operation. In answer to the contention that if the 1906
act were held invalid the act of 1893 must likewise be invalid,
the Court of Appeals said: "The act of 1893 has gone into
effect, and the government has been organized under it. To
hold it void would be to throw the government into chaos;
and this no court is required to do. It is now too late to question
its validity."
Compliance with the State Constitution would have compelled a redistricting in 1928. The sessions of 1928, 1930, 1932
and the special session of 1933 have all come and gone, however,
and nothing has been done. A majority of the Legislature are
clearly satisfied with the present arrangement. Moreover, in
spite of the mandatory provision of the Constitution, there appears to be no authority to force a redistricting. The Court of
Appeals has specifically declared in fact that "the legislative
districts must continue to embrace the same territory until
'4
changed by the power which created them."
In holding the 1906 act invalid the Court of Appeals entertained no doubt that members of the next Legislature, "impelled by their sense of duty, the obligations of their oath of
office, together with that spirit of justice which is the heritage
of the race, will redistrict the state as the Constitution requires." This prophecy, as subsequent events lend abundant
testimony, was little short of naive. Twelve years passed before
a redistricting act was adopted. It is this act under which we
elect our state legislators today and against which act sufficient
evidence has already been introduced.
4Mullen

v. McDonald, 101 Ky. 87; 39 S. W. 698 (1897).
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Viewing the situation in the light of these facts, the present writer harbors no illusions that the coming session of the
General Assembly will provide an equitable system of redistricting. The representative who has been elected from a district with only 82000 inhabitants cannot be expected to favor
the addition of twice that number to his district. Even less
likely is the Democratic party as a whole to surrender the
political machinery by which it has disenfranchlised nearly
thirty-four percent of the Republicans of Kentucky.
Denial of the right of suffrage because of race, color,
previous condition of servitude, or sex has long since been outlawed. Yet abridgment of the right to vote because of party
affiliations remains perfectly legitimate and equality of representation a mere farce.
"He has studied our Constitution in vain," says Judge Barker,
"who has not discovered that the keystone of that great instrument Is
equality, equality of men, equality of representation.-When our forefathers emigrated from their European.home, it was in the main to
escape from the oppression of inequality.-When they threw off the
supervising government of the mother country, it was because they
were denied equality of representation; or as they then expressed the
evil they had imposed upon them taxation without representation.Inequality of representation is a tyranny to which no people worthy
of freedom will tamely submit. To say that a man in Spencer county
shall have seven times as much influence in the government of the
state as a man in Ohio, Butler or Edmonson is to say that six men
out of every seven in those counties are not represented in the government at all. They are required to submit to taxation without representation. It was this kind of oppression which inspired that great
struggle for freedom which began on Lexington Green in 1775 and
ended at Yorktown in 1781.-Equality of representation is a vital
principal of democracy. In proportion as this is denied or withheld,
the government becomes oligarchical or monarchical."

CoNGREssIONAL DImcTRs op KENTUCKY
An inspection of the Congressional districts of Kentucky
sl~ows the same inequalities of population as are prevalent in
the representative and senatorial districts of the State. One
has only to observe the bottle-neck by which Jackson and Owsley
counties were connected with, and grouped in, the old tenth
district to realize that gerrymandering is by no means a lost
art in

Kentucky.

Prior to the 1932 redistricting act, necessitated by Congressional reapportionment and the accompanying loss of two
rRagland N%
Anderson, 30, K. L. R. 1199; 100 S. W. 867 (1907).
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representatives, the fifth and eleventh districts contained populations of 355,350 and 335,179 respectively. Both districts were
Republican strongholds. In contrast the old eighth district.,
which was Democratic, had a population of only 165,981, or
considerably less than one-half as many as the above named
districts.
The recent redistricting, it should be observed, has failed
to improve the situation. Louisville and Jefferson County, formerly the fifth but now composing the new fourth district, is
again the largest of the State with its population of 355;350.
The new ninth district, made from the old Republican eleventh
district simply by adding Jackson and Owsley counties from
the old tenth, has a population of 352,869. On the other extreme
the first district has a population of only 238,189, the second
district 238,494, and the fifth district 240,293. It has been
called an interesting commentary upon the 1932 Redistricting
Act that "the six new districts of Democratic hue have an
average of 276,794, while the three districts with Republican
leanings have an average of 317,939."
The startling aspect of the entire picture is that these discriminations have been upheld by the Supyeme Court of the
United States. When Kentucky's 1932 Congressional Redistricting Act was first questioned, a three judge district court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky held it invalid. Representatives to Congress were, therefore, compelled to run from
the state at large in the November election, not without great
confusion, however, as to the proper methods of filing. The
decision of the Supreme Court December 5, 1932,6 reversing
the holding of the district court only added to this confusion.
Was the election-at-large valid when the General Assembly had
provided constitutional congressional districts? The difficulty
was solved by acceptance of this method and the representatives so elected have served in extraordinary session of 1933.
The congressional reapportionment Act of 1911 providing
that representatives be elected "by districts composed of contiguous and compact territory, and containing as nearly as
practicable an equal number of inhabitants" was commonly believed to prohibit such, gross inequalities and was relied upon
'Mahan v. Hitme, 53 Supreme Court 223.
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by complainants in the above cited case. Did not the apportionment Acts of 1842, 1872, 1882, 1891 and 1901, containing
substantially the same provisions, lend support to their contention?
Yet it will be remembered that reapportionment !&ct of
June 18, 1929, under the Fjfteenth Census, none having been
made under the Fourteen Census, omitted the requirements as
to compactness, contiguity, and equality in population. This
omission moreover was not an accident or an oversight. The
apportionment bill as originally introduced included the 1911
provisions, but the House of Representatives, after debate,
struck them out. Subsequent efforts to amend the bill and
reincorporate such provisions met with failure. Thus it "was
manifestly the intention of Congress not to reenact the provision as to compactness, contiguity, and equality in population with respect to the reapportionment under the Act of
1929.'"7 Furthermore, said the Supreme Court, the provisions
of the 1911 Act were not applicable in spite of the fact that
they had never been repealed. No repeal was necessary. The
requirements of that act "fell with the apportionment to which
they expressly applied." Gerrymandering, therefore, becomes
a legalized method of disenfranchising political opponents.
In the light of these circumstances the constitutional provision for apportionment of representatives among the states
according to "the whole number of persons" becomes hopelessly inadequate. Equitable congressional apportionment obviously comes to naught when state legislatures may perpetrate
the very injustices prohibited to Congress. Such a provision
is comparable to a law which protects an individual from violence committed by citizens of other states while leaving the
road clear for such. violence by his next door neighbor. Are
we so provincial today as to submit to discriminations within
our own state while demanding equality as between states? The
electorate stands in silence. Popular majorities become increasingly helpless, and the principle for which we once fought
and died we now relinquish with ne'er a struggle.

IWrood v. Broon, 53 Supreme Court 1, Oct. 18, 1932.

